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Abstract 
Creativity is a common aspiration for individuals, organizations, and societies. Here, however, 
we test whether creativity increases dishonesty. We propose that a creative personality and a 
creative mindset promote individuals’ ability to justify their behavior, which, in turn, leads to 
unethical behavior. In five studies, we show that participants with creative personalities tended to 
cheat more than less creative individuals, and that dispositional creativity is a better predictor of 
unethical behavior than intelligence (Experiment 1). In addition, we find that participants who 
were primed to think creatively were more likely to behave dishonestly than those in a control 
condition (Experiment 2) and that greater ability to justify their dishonest behavior explained the 
link between creativity and increased dishonesty (Experiments 3 and 4). Finally, we demonstrate 
that dispositional creativity moderates the influence of temporarily priming creativity on 
dishonest behavior (Experiment 5). The results provide evidence for an association between 
creativity and dishonesty, thus highlighting a dark side of creativity.  
 
Key words: creativity, creative thinking, ethics, dishonesty, morality, moral flexibility, 
intelligence, unethical behavior 
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“Evil always turns up in this world through some genius or other.”  
- Denis Diderot (1713-1784) 
 
The ability to generate novel ideas and think creatively about problems has long been 
considered an important skill for individuals, as well as for organizations and societies. Creative 
thinking allows individuals to solve problems effectively (Mumford & Gustafson, 1988) and to 
remain flexible (Flach, 1990) so that they can cope with the opportunities and changes in their 
day-to-day lives (Runco, 2004). At a more macro level, societies use new inventions, original 
scientific findings, and novel social programs to advance, and organizations need them to adapt 
to changing environments and succeed in the marketplace (Oldham & Cummings, 1996; 
Goldenberg & Mazursky, 2001; Goldenberg, Mazursky, & Solomon, 1999). The important role 
of creativity in human progress and adaptation is likely one reason why scholars across 
disciplines long have been interested in understanding how creative thinking occurs and how it 
can be fostered (Simonton, 2003). 
Creativity research in psychology has been conducted from different perspectives. Some 
work has focused on evaluating the creativity of products and individuals’ accomplishments 
(e.g., Amabile, 1983; Baer, Kaufman, & Gentile, 2004; Kaufman, Baer, Cole, & Sexton, 2008; 
Plucker, & Renzulli, 1999); other work has explored the cognitive and motivational processes 
that lead to creative ideas (e.g., Friedman & Forster, 2001; Hirt, McDonald, & Melton, 1996; 
Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995; Sternberg, 1999a) and the contextual factors that influence creative 
problem solving (e.g., Amabile, 1979; Forster, Friedman, & Liberman, 2004; Galinsky & 
Moskowitz, 2000; Markman, Lindberg, Kray, & Galinsky, 2007; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009); Creativity and Dishonesty  4 
 
and still other research has examined the relationship between individuals’ personality and their 
creativity (Kershner & Ledger, 1985; for reviews, see Feist, 1998, 1999; Simonton, 2000, 2003).  
Despite their varying focus, these approaches share a basic premise: because creativity 
improves problem solving and opens doors to new solutions and opportunities, creativity should 
be stimulated. But is creativity always beneficial? While the positive aspects of creativity have 
been praised and tested empirically (Goldenberg & Mazursky, 2001; Sternberg, 1999a, 1999b), it 
is possible that creative thinking may also have a hidden cost in the form of increased dishonesty 
when used to resolve ethical dilemmas.  
In the current research, we test for this possibility and propose that creativity has a dark 
side when applied to ethical behavior. We conduct five studies to examine whether there is a 
positive and reliable relationship between creativity and dishonesty, and to investigate the 
psychological mechanisms explaining this link. 
Creativity and Dishonest Behavior 
Creativity is defined as the ability to produce ideas that are both novel (i.e., original, 
unexpected) and appropriate (i.e., useful, adaptive to task constraints) (Amabile, 1983, 1988). 
Over the past several decades, researchers have explored many of the psychological factors that 
are considered vital to the creative process and have identified two main components underlying 
creative performance: divergent thinking (Guilford, 1968, 1982) and cognitive flexibility (Spiro 
& Jehng, 1990). Divergent thinking refers to the ability of individuals to develop original ideas 
and to envision multiple solutions to a given problem. It involves thinking “without boundaries,” 
or “outside the box” (Thompson, 2008, p. 226). Cognitive flexibility, by contrast, describes the 
ability of individuals to restructure knowledge in multiple different ways depending on changing 
situational demands (i.e., the complexity of the situation).  Creativity and Dishonesty  5 
 
Typically operating together, divergent thinking and cognitive flexibility help people find 
creative solutions to difficult problems, which may be interpreted from different points of view. 
One such context is provided by ethical dilemmas. Ethical dilemmas often require people to 
weigh two opposing forces: the desire to maximize self-interest and the desire to maintain a 
positive view of oneself (Mead, Baumeister, Gino, Schweitzer, & Ariely, 2009). Recent research 
has suggested that individuals tend to resolve this tension through self-serving rationalizations: 
they behave dishonestly enough to profit from their unethical behavior, but honestly enough to 
maintain a positive self-concept as honest human beings (Mazar, Amir & Ariely, 2008; Gino, 
Ayal & Ariely, 2009). When facing the opportunity to behave dishonestly, in fact, most people 
cheat, if only by a little bit, but not as much as they possibly could (Ayal & Gino, 2011; Gino et 
al., 2009). This “minor” cheating can be justified through various means. For instance, one might 
reason that other people would cheat under the same circumstances or that a little cheating won’t 
hurt anyone.  
Such self-serving justifications can help individuals convince themselves that their 
behavior is in fact morally appropriate and, as a result, that there is no need to negatively update 
their moral self-image. As a result, any situation in which there is room to justify potential 
dishonest or self-interested behavior is likely to promote dishonesty (Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002; 
Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). This tendency to behave in a self-interested manner 
when the behavior in question can be justified was demonstrated years ago in a compelling study 
by Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, and Mentzer (1979). In the study, participants had to choose one of 
two rooms in which they would watch a movie with another person and then answer a short 
survey. In one room, the other person was physically handicapped; in the other room, the person 
was not. When the movie shown was the same in both rooms, participants were more likely to Creativity and Dishonesty  6 
 
choose the room where they would sit with the handicapped person rather than the room where 
they would sit with the non-handicapped partner. But when different movies were projected in 
the two rooms, most people chose to avoid the stigmatized person since they could easily justify 
their choices.   
Similarly, Schweitzer and Hsee (2002) conducted a negotiation study in which sellers of 
a car provided a buyer with a mileage estimate from a range of possible values and could lie 
about the estimate. The results indicated that sellers lied to a greater extent when the provided 
range was wide rather than narrow; they could justify the lie by using their increased uncertainty 
about the true mileage. Sellers processed the information about the car’s mileage in a self-
serving manner, allowing them to gain financially.  
Thus, when individuals can easily generate justifications to reinterpret or rationalize 
unethical actions they are tempted to engage in, they will be more likely to behave dishonestly 
for monetary gains as compared to situations in which justifying the behavior is rather difficult. 
As noted by Kunda (1990), people reach the conclusions they want to reach, “but their ability to 
do so is constrained by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these 
conclusions” (p. 480). Greater creativity, we suggest, facilitates this self-serving justification 
process. More specifically, we propose that when people are motivated to behave dishonestly so 
as to benefit financially in a given situation (or to advance their self-interest in other forms), 
divergent thinking is likely to help them develop original ways to bypass moral rules. Similarly, 
cognitive flexibility is likely to help them reinterpret available information regarding their own 
behavior in a self-serving way. Indeed, as prior research has suggested, creative people are able 
to perceive and describe what remains hidden from the view of others (Carson, Peterson, & Creativity and Dishonesty  7 
 
Higgins, 2003), and they are also able to develop original ideas and to envision multiple 
solutions to a given problem (Guilford, 1968, 1982). 
As an example, consider a person’s process of figuring out which tax deductions he is 
comfortable with and which lie beyond his ethically acceptable boundaries. A person who is 
highly creative or has been asked to think creativity about this task may be more likely to 
identify original steps to follow and to justify misreporting on taxes in novel ways. As this 
example illustrates, greater creativity may promote dishonesty in two ways. First, it can help 
individuals find creative loopholes to solve difficult tasks they are facing, even if that entails 
crossing ethical boundaries.
1 Second, creativity may help individuals generate various credible 
reasons to justify their own actions before engaging in them – even when those actions are 
unethical. In this paper, we focus on this second direct consequence of creativity. In our studies, 
we employ tasks in which participants have the opportunity to behave dishonestly and are 
tempted to do so. We do not study whether participants cheat in more or less creative ways given 
a set of rules to complete the tasks. Rather, we focus on whether creativity influences the way 
people who are tempted to behave dishonestly justify their unethical actions.  
In short, we expect creativity to be positively associated with dishonest behavior when 
people face ethical dilemmas (Hypothesis 1). In addition, we expect this relationship to hold both 
in the case of dispositional creativity and in the case of primes that temporarily trigger a creative 
mindset (Hypothesis 2). Several studies have demonstrated that simple primes can automatically 
activate certain goals and mindsets (Chartrand & Bargh, 1996; Schaller, 2003), which, in turn, 
influence perception and behavior without explicit conscious awareness (Bargh, 1990; Bargh & 
                                                      
1 For instance, in the field of professional legal services, lawyers who are creative or are paid to think creatively 
often end up exploiting the loopholes and ambiguities of the law on behalf of clients, and their “creative 
compliance” with regulatory requirements undermines the purpose and effectiveness of existing regulations 
(McBarnet, 1988; McBarnet & Whelan, 1991). Creativity and Dishonesty  8 
 
Chartrand, 1999). For instance, Fitzsimons, Chartrand, and Fitzsimons (2008) found that 
participants primed with Apple logos (i.e., the logos of a company commonly associated with 
creativity and innovation) behaved more creatively on subsequent tasks as compared to 
participants primed with IBM logos and control participants. Finally, we suggest that creativity 
promotes dishonesty by increasing people’s ability to self-justify their bad deeds (Hypothesis 3). 
That is, we propose that creativity increases moral flexibility, which we define as individuals’ 
ability to justify their immoral actions by generating multiple and diverse reasons these actions 
can be judged as ethically appropriate. 
Overview of the Present Research 
We test our main hypotheses in a series of studies. First, as a pilot study, we collect field 
data to examine whether people in jobs that require high levels of creativity are more morally 
flexible than others. Next, we conduct five laboratory studies in which participants have the 
opportunity to behave dishonestly by overstating their performance and, as a result, earn more 
money. In Experiment 1, we measure creativity as an individual difference and examine whether 
this personality trait is associated with increased dishonest behavior. In Experiment 2, we prime 
cognitions associated with creativity and examine whether they temporarily promote dishonesty. 
In Experiments 3 and 4, we explore the mechanism explaining the link between creativity and 
dishonesty by focusing on people’s ability to justify unethical behavior. Finally, in Experiment 5, 
we examine whether individual differences in creativity moderate the effect of priming a creative 
mindset on dishonesty.  
Across all our studies, we consistently find that greater creativity promotes dishonesty by 
increasing individuals’ ability to justify their unethical actions, both when considering measures 
of creative personality and when temporarily activating a creative mindset. Creativity and Dishonesty  9 
 
Pilot Study: Creativity and Dishonesty in the Field 
We started our investigation of the relationship between creativity and dishonesty by 
collecting data from an advertising agency located in the Southern United States. Ninety-nine 
employees (40 male; Mage=33.48, SD=8.16) across 17 different departments within the same 
company responded to a short online survey.  
First, respondents indicated how likely they would be to engage in each of eight ethically 
questionable behaviors (e.g., “Take home office supplies from work,” “Inflate your business 
expense report”; α=.78) on a seven-point scale (1=Not likely, 7=Very likely). Next, they read 
two scenarios describing a person who has the opportunity to behave dishonestly (from Gino, 
Norton, & Ariely, 2010; see Appendix A) and then indicated how likely they would be to behave 
unethically if they were in the actor’s shoes (using the same seven-point scale). Finally, 
respondents identified their department within the company and indicated how much creativity 
they thought was required on their job (on a 7-point scale, 1=Not at all, 7=Very much). Three 
managers in the executive office also provided ratings for the level of creativity required in each 
department (using a 10-point scale, 1=Not at all, 10=Very much),  
We computed the z-scores for all the measures included in the study. As Table 1 shows, 
the creativity required on the job (as judged by both employees and managers) was positively 
correlated with employees’ self-reported dishonesty. These results provide some preliminary 
evidence for the hypothesized association between creativity and dishonesty. 
Experiment 1: Effects of a Creative Personality 
Our first study tests the hypothesis that individuals who naturally have a more creative 
personality are also more likely to behave dishonestly. In addition, the study examines whether Creativity and Dishonesty  10 
 
creativity as an individual difference is a better predictor of dishonesty than another dispositional 
factor often linked to creativity: intelligence.  
While prior personality research has found a negative relationship between intelligence 
and academic cheating (Hetherington & Feldman, 1964; Johnson & Gormly, 1971), Sternberg 
(2001) proposed that there is a dialectical relationship between creativity and intelligence. In his 
view, intelligence is a necessary condition for creativity, which depends both on generation of 
novel ideas and critical analysis of them. If Sternberg’s proposed positive relationship between 
intelligence and creativity does in fact exist, one might also wonder whether it is intelligence and 
not creativity that leads to dishonesty. Experiment 1 jointly tested the links between intelligence, 
creativity, and dishonest behavior.  
Method 
  Participants. Ninety-seven students from local universities in the Southeastern United 
States (45 male; Mage=21, SD=3.59) enrolled in the study for payment. Participants were paid a 
$2 show-up fee, $3 for completing the online portion of the study, and then could earn an 
additional $20 based on the choices they made throughout the study. 
Procedure. A week before the lab portion of the study, participants completed an online 
survey that included dispositional measures of both intelligence and creativity. On the day they 
showed up at the lab, participants were told the study included three different tasks testing their 
problem-solving abilities, general knowledge, and perceptual skills, which had been combined 
for convenience. The three tasks were a perceptual task, a problem-solving task, and a multiple-
choice task. We randomized the order in which these tasks were presented to participants. Each 
task provided participants with the opportunity to cheat.  Creativity and Dishonesty  11 
 
We used multiple measures of creativity and intelligence as well as various tasks to 
assess cheating to test the robustness of our proposed relationship between creativity as an 
individual difference and dishonesty. 
Dispositional Measures 
Creativity. We used three measures to assess participants’ creativity, all of which have 
been shown to robustly predict creative performance (e.g., Barron & Harrington, 1981; Feist, 
1999; Gough, 1979; Tierney & Farmer, 2002; Zhou & Oldham, 2001). The first measure was 
Gough’s creative personality scale (Gough, 1979). This measure asked participants to choose 
adjectives that best described them from a list of 30 adjectives. The scoring key was such that 
participants received a point every time they checked an adjective related to creative personality 
(e.g., insightful, inventive, original, resourceful, unconventional).  
The second measure consisted of Hocevar’s creative behavior inventory (Hocevar, 1980). 
This inventory includes a list of 77 activities and accomplishments that are considered to be 
creative (e.g., painted an original picture, wrote an original computer program, excluding school 
or university work). For each item, participants indicated the frequency of the behavior in their 
adolescent and adult life. The scoring rule was to sum up each participant’s ratings for the 
activities included in the inventory.  
Finally, the third measure of creative personality was a five-item scale assessing an 
individual’s creative cognitive style (Kirton, 1976). The scale included items such as “I have a 
lot of creative ideas” and “I prefer tasks that enable me to think creatively” (=.82). Participants 
indicated the extent to which they agreed with each item on a seven-point scale (1=strongly 
disagree, 7=strongly agree). The scoring rule was to average each participant’s ratings across the 
items.  Creativity and Dishonesty  12 
 
Intelligence. As for intelligence, we used two different measures. The first measure was 
the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), which consisted of three questions testing individuals’ 
reliance on logic versus intuition; the questions are correlated with IQ (Frederick, 2005). Each 
question presents an easy “intuitive” answer that is actually incorrect. For instance, one of the 
questions asked “A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How 
much does the ball cost?” One might intuitively but incorrectly say, “$0.10.” A person who is 
more thorough might respond that the ball actually costs $0.05 (.05+(1+.05)=1.1). Those with 
higher IQs tend to notice that the intuitive answer contains inconsistencies that deserve a further 
(and more time-consuming) examination.  
The second measure used was the Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale, which assesses verbal 
intelligence (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). In this task, participants were presented with a 
series of ten words (e.g., dwindle, palliate); for each word, they were asked to choose which of 
six answer options was closest in meaning to the target word.  
Tasks 
Perception task. In the visual perception task (developed by Gino et al., 2010), 
participants were presented with a square that was divided into two triangles by a diagonal line. 
In each trial, a total of 20 dots appeared inside the square for one second and then disappeared. 
The dots were distributed between the two triangles, and the participants had to identify which of 
the two triangles (right or left) contained more dots by clicking either on a button labeled “more 
on left” or on a button labeled “more on right.” Each trial included a square with a different 
number of dots in the left and right triangles. 
The instructions participants received explained how the task worked and gave them an 
example. The instructions informed participants that their task was “to indicate whether there Creativity and Dishonesty  13 
 
were more dots on the right side of the square or on the left side of the square” in each round. 
They were also informed that a dot might sometimes be on the box’s diagonal line. 
Importantly, the payout in each trial was determined by the following rule: For each left 
decision (“more on left”), participants earned 0.5 cents, while for each right decision (“more on 
right”), they earned ten times as much (i.e., 5 cents). Using this payment structure, on every trial 
where there were more dots on the left, the task presented a conflict between providing an 
accurate answer (indicating left) and profit maximization (indicating right). Thus, this payment 
structure triggered a motivation to find more dots on the right side, given that participants 
received the payoff simply on the basis of their responses (“more on the left” or “more on the 
right”) and not on the basis of accuracy. 
To make sure participants understood the task, they first played a few practice trials with 
no payment. Once the task was clear, participants played 200 trials (which were based on two 
blocks of 100 identical trials) on which they earned real money. On each trial, they received 
feedback about their earnings on that trial and on their cumulative earnings up to that point.  
In 50 of the trials (out of each block of 100), it was clear that one triangle had more dots 
than the other, while in the remaining 50 trials, it was somewhat ambiguous whether there was a 
larger number of dots in the left or right triangles (see Figure 1 for examples). We refer to these 
trials as “ambiguous,” and we focus on them in our analysis since these are the trials that allowed 
for self-serving interpretation of the position of the dots. In each ambiguous trial, the participants 
could benefit from cheating by creatively misinterpreting the ambiguous information they were 
asked to evaluate. That is, participants could intentionally misrepresent their actual perception of 
these ambiguous trials and report “more on the right” simply because they realized that by doing 
so they would earn a higher payoff. Thus, we use these ambiguous trials to measure dishonesty.  Creativity and Dishonesty  14 
 
Given the structure of this task, participants could earn a maximum of $10 on this 
perceptual task (by always pressing the “more on the right” button). Upon completion of this 
task, participants reported their performance as indicated on the computer on a collection slip, 
which they were to hand to the experimenter at the end of the study so they could be paid.
2 
  Problem-solving task. For the problem-solving task, each participant received two sheets 
of paper. The first was a worksheet containing 20 matrices, each based on a set of 12 three-digit 
numbers (e.g., 5.78, see Mazar et al., 2008). The second sheet was a collection slip on which 
participants were asked to report their performance. In this task, participants had five minutes to 
find two numbers per matrix that added up to 10, but this duration was not sufficient for anyone 
to solve all 20 matrices. For each pair of numbers correctly identified, participants received 
$0.25 (for a maximum payment of $5). After the five minutes had passed, participants were told 
to fold their worksheets and place them in a recycling box positioned in a corner of the room; 
next, they were asked to write down their performance scores on their collection slips. There 
were no identifiers on the worksheets, thus allowing participants to feel anonymous as they 
reported their performance on the task. However, we changed the last two digits in one of the 
matrices on the worksheet and in the example provided on the back of the collection slip so that 
we could compare actual to reported performance. 
Multiple-choice task. This task consisted of a general knowledge quiz with 50 multiple-
choice questions of varying difficulty (e.g., How far can a kangaroo jump? What is the capital of 
Italy?). Participants received $.10 per correct answer (for a maximum payment of $5). The 
experimenter told them to circle their answers on their question sheet and explained that they 
                                                      
2 Although we use this task to assess cheating, choosing an answer that assures higher levels of payment could 
reflect motivated perception (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006). That is, participants may perceptually disambiguate what 
they see on the screen to serve their goal to earn more money. We acknowledge this limitation, which is in part 
alleviated in this study by the use of multiple tasks to assess dishonest behavior. Creativity and Dishonesty  15 
 
would transfer their answers to a bubble sheet after finishing. When participants finished the 
quiz, the experimenter told them that, by mistake, she had photocopied bubble sheets that already 
had the correct answers lightly marked on them. She then asked the participants to use these pre-
marked bubble sheets, recycle the test sheets with their original responses, and submit the bubble 
sheets for payment. From these instructions, it was clear that participants could use the pre-
marked bubble sheets to cheat when transferring their responses. However, as in the previous 
task, we were able to determine the extent of cheating by including a unique ID on both the test 
sheet and the bubble sheet. 
Pilot Study 
We recruited a non-overlapping group of participants (N=46, Mage=21.26, SD=1.84) and 
conducted a pilot study to examine whether participants would perceive the payment used in 
Experiment 1 as fair. In addition, we tested whether participants would consider cheating on the 
tasks employed in Experiment 1 as unethical and morally wrong. We asked participants in this 
pilot study to follow the same procedure as in the laboratory portion of Experiment 1 (without 
the online survey) with only one difference. This time participants did not have the opportunity 
to cheat in any of the three tasks. We used the same payment structure as in the lab portion of 
Experiment 1 (i.e., $2 show-up fee, plus additional payment based on performance throughout 
the study). Upon completion of the study, we asked them two questions. First, we asked them to 
evaluate whether the payment structure used in the study was fair compared to other studies they 
may have participated in (1=not fair at all, 4=fair, 7=more than fair). Second, we asked them to 
imagine having the opportunity to self-report performance in each of the three tasks included in 
the study they had just completed and thus cheat for more money. For this question, participants Creativity and Dishonesty  16 
 
indicated the extent to which over-reporting performance on the tasks would be morally wrong 
and unethical (α=.73) using a seven-point scale (1=not at all, 4=somewhat, 7=extremely).  
On average, participants earned $11.24 (SD=1.26) in this pilot study, which lasted about 
45-60 minutes. They reported the payment to be fair (M=4.20, SD=0.98), and indicated that 
overstating performance on the tasks included in the experiment would be unethical (M=5.11, 
SD=0.76; a rating significantly higher than the scale mid-point, t[45]=9.46, p<.001). Together, 
these results suggest that any evidence of dishonesty in Experiment 1 would occur in a context in 
which participants perceive their payment as fair and construe the tasks as ethical dilemmas.  
Results and Discussion 
As Table 2 shows, the three measures of creative personality were significantly and 
positively correlated with one another, as were the two measures of intelligence. The measures of 
creative personality were also positively and significantly correlated with the level of dishonesty 
on each of the three tasks included in the study.
3 However, we did not find evidence of a link 
between creativity and intelligence, nor a link between intelligence and dishonesty.  
Next, we computed a z-score for each of our measures and averaged the individual scores 
to create one composite measure for creative personality, intelligence, and extent of dishonesty.
4 
We used this aggregate measures in a regression analysis testing whether dispositional creativity 
predicted dishonesty while controlling for intelligence. This analysis revealed that creativity as 
an individual difference was positively and significantly associated with dishonesty (B=.48, 
[SE=.084], β=.51, t=5.73, p<.001) while intelligence was not (B=.059, [SE=.086], β=.062, 
                                                      
3 For the visual perception task, we conducted further analyses to examine cheating on unambiguous trials. We 
found that it was highly correlated with cheating on ambiguous trials (r=.91, p<.001) and moderately correlated with 
creative personality (Gough’s creative personality: r=.27, p<.01; Creative cognitive style: r=.19, p=.069; Hocevar’s 
creative behavior inventory: r=.19, p=.065). However, cheating on unambiguous trials was not correlated with 
intelligence (Cognitive refection test score: r=.04, p=.72; Mill vocabulary test score: r=-.02, p=.87).  
4 We also created z-scores for participants’ actual performance on the problem-solving task and the multiple-choice 
task and found they were not correlated with dispositional creativity (r=.15, p=.15 and r=-.06, p=.59, respectively). Creativity and Dishonesty  17 
 
t=.695, p=.49). These results provide support for our hypothesis that dispositional creativity 
promotes dishonesty.  
Experiment 2: Creative Mindset and Dishonesty 
  In Experiment 2, we examine whether activating a creative mindset temporarily promotes 
dishonest behavior in the same way a creative personality does.   
Method 
  Participants. One-hundred eleven undergraduate and graduate students from local 
universities in the Southeastern United States (52 male; Mage=23.27, SD=3.32) participated in the 
study for payment. They were paid a $4 show-up fee and could earn an additional $10 based on 
their reported performance. 
Procedure. Participants engaged in three presumably unrelated tasks: a creativity prime 
(our manipulation) followed by a two-minute filler task, a creativity task (used as a manipulation 
check), and the matrix task employed in Experiment 1 (used to assess dishonest behavior).  
Creativity prime. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two priming conditions: 
creative mindset vs. control. Previous research has successfully employed priming to activate a 
creative mindset (e.g., Fitzsimons et al., 2008; Sassenberg & Moskowitz, 2005). We employed a 
scrambled sentence test, a frequently used method (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Chartrand & 
Bargh, 1996) for manipulating respondents’ momentary mindset. All participants were asked to 
construct grammatically correct four-word sentences (e.g., the sky is blue) from a set of five 
randomly positioned words (e.g., sky, is, the, why, blue). For the participants in the creative-
mindset condition, 12 of the 20 sentences included words related to creativity (creative, original, 
inventiveness, novel, new, innovative, invention, creativity, ingenious, imagination, originality, Creativity and Dishonesty  18 
 
and ideas), while for the participants in the control condition, no words related to creativity were 
included. This priming task was followed by a two-minute filler task to distract participants. 
Manipulation check. We measured creativity triggered by the prime using the Duncker 
candle problem. Participants were shown a picture containing several objects on a table: a 
candle, a pack of matches, and a box of tacks, all of which were next to a cardboard wall (see 
Figure 2). Participants were given three minutes “to figure out, using only the objects on the 
table, how to attach the candle to the wall so that the candle burns properly and does not drip 
wax on the table or the floor.” The correct solution consists of emptying the box of tacks, tacking 
it to the wall, and placing the candle inside, so that the box of tacks is used as a candleholder. In 
this task, finding the correct solution is a measure of insight creativity because it involves the 
ability to see objects as performing atypical functions (i.e., the box of tacks can be used as a 
stand) (Duncker, 1945; Glucksberg & Weisberg, 1966; Maddux & Galinsky, 2009). 
Problem-solving task. Next, participants completed the same problem-solving task with 
the 20 matrices used in Experiment 1. We assessed cheating on this task by computing the 
difference between participants’ self-reported and actual performance. 
Final questionnaire. Finally, participants filled out a questionnaire including demographic 
questions and post-experimental questions assessing their awareness of the priming (Bargh & 
Chartrand, 2000). Participants were excluded from the data if they indicated awareness of the 
priming (e.g., “Something to do with creativity, originality, novelty”; “Words like creativity, 
originality used often”) or the purpose of the experiment. No participant was disqualified under 
these exclusion criteria.  
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Manipulation check. The percentage of participants who correctly solved the candle task 
was larger in the creative-mindset condition than in the control condition (47.3% vs. 26.8%), 
χ
2(1,N=111)=5.00, p<.05, suggesting that our priming manipulation was effective. 
Cheating on the problem-solving task. The average number of matrices by which 
participants overstated their performance was greater in the creative-mindset condition (M=2.71, 
SD=3.15) than in the control condition (M=1.09, SD=1.98), t(109)=3.25, p<.01.
5 Furthermore, 
the percentage of participants who overstated their performance was also higher (49% vs. 27%, 

2[1,N=111]=5.87, p<.05).  
Taken together, these results demonstrate that even when activated temporarily, a 
creative mindset promotes dishonesty.  
Experiment 3: The Power of Justifications 
  So far, we have demonstrated that creativity promotes dishonesty when people face an 
ethical dilemma and are motivated to behave unethically, both when creativity is measured as an 
individual difference and when it is temporarily activated through priming. In Experiment 3, we 
investigate the psychological mechanism that may explain this relationship. We proposed that 
creativity promotes dishonesty by increasing people’s ability to justify their unethical actions.  
In Experiment 3, we test this hypothesis by manipulating a feature of the task participants 
completed so that they would have more or less room to justify dishonesty. The less room the 
task provides for justifying cheating, the more moral flexibility individuals will need if they are 
to behave dishonestly on that task without feeling too guilty about their actions. We expect 
creativity to be particularly conducive to cheating on those tasks since it enhances moral 
                                                      
5 Participants’ actual performance on the problem-solving task did not differ across conditions (Mcreative-minset=7.31, 
SD=2.05 vs. Mcontrol=7.20, SD=2.24), t(109)<1, p=.78.  Creativity and Dishonesty  20 
 
flexibility. By contrast, on tasks that provide room for justification by design, creativity may be 
less “beneficial” for dishonesty since moral flexibility is not needed to justify cheating. 
Method 
  Participants. One-hundred forty-five individuals from a city in the Northeastern United 
States (57 male; 112 students; Mage=22.41, SD=2.81) participated in a series of unrelated studies 
for $20. Our study was the first one the participants completed. 
Design and procedure. The study employed two between-subjects factors: prime (control 
vs. creative) and room for justification (high vs. low). As their first task, participants completed 
the sentence scramble task used in Experiment 2 and were thus exposed to either a creative prime 
or a control prime. Next, they completed the Remote Association Task (RAT, Mednick, 1962), a 
measure commonly used to assess creativity by assessing people’s ability to identify associations 
between words that are normally associated. In this task, participants are asked to find a word 
that is logically linked to all of three words provided. For instance, “cold” is the common word 
linking the words “sore-shoulder-seat.” Participants were given five minutes to solve 17 RAT 
items (see Appendix B).  
As their next task, participants were asked to roll a six-sided die anonymously (a task 
adapted from Shalvi et al., 2011). For this task, they would earn money based on the reported 
outcome. Before the beginning of the study, the experimenter placed a plastic cup with a die in it 
on each desk. We introduced our second manipulation in this task. In the low-justification 
condition, participants were instructed to privately roll the die in the cup only once (by shaking 
the cup) and then report their outcome on the collection slip they had received. In the high-
justification condition, participants instead were asked to roll the die a first time and then to roll 
it again a few more times to make sure the die was legitimate. After making sure the die was Creativity and Dishonesty  21 
 
legitimate, participants had to report the outcome of the first roll. In both conditions, the bonus 
payment for this task varied with the outcome of the die roll: participants received $1 if the 
outcome was 1, $2 if it was 2, and so on, up to $6 if the outcome of the die roll was 6. This task 
gave participants the opportunity to lie by reporting an outcome higher than the one actually 
obtained on the first die roll. 
Having the possibility to roll the die multiple times gives participants room to justify their 
potential lies (Shalvi et al., 2011). We used this justification manipulation to find evidence for 
the mechanism linking creativity and dishonest behavior through moderation. We predicted that 
rolling the die multiple times would moderate the relationship between a creative mindset and 
dishonesty. Specifically, in the low-justification condition, we expected greater lying in the 
creative-mindset condition than in the control condition. However, we expected this difference to 
become less prominent in the high-justification condition since individuals in a creative mindset 
already have the ability to generate reasons they can use to rationalize their unethical behavior. 
Results and Discussion 
  Manipulation check. We used the number of correct responses on the RAT as our 
manipulation check to determine whether participants primed to think creatively were more 
likely to complete this creative task successfully. Participants in the creative-mindset condition 
performed better on the RAT (M=8.41, SD=2.92) as compared to those in the control condition 
(M=6.91, SD=2.94), t(143)=3.07, p=.003. This result suggests that our priming was effective. 
Die roll outcome. A 2 (prime) X 2 (justification) between-subjects ANOVA using the 
self-reported outcome of the die roll as the dependent measure revealed a significant interaction, 
F(1,141)=4.05, p=.046, η
2
p=.03 (see Figure 3). For participants in the low-justification condition, 
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mindset (F[1,141]=13.58, p<.001). However, for participants in the high-justification condition, 
the difference in reported outcomes between the creative-mindset and the neutral-mindset 
condition did not reach significance (F[1,141]=1.49, p=.225). This analysis also revealed a main 
effect for both the prime manipulation (F[1,141]=12.83, p<.001, η
2
p=.08) and the justification 
manipulation (F[1,141]=5.50, p=.02, η
2
p=.04).  
Together, these results provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that creativity 
promotes dishonesty by increasing individuals’ ability to generate reasons to justify their 
unethical behavior. 
Experiment 4: Justifications and Creative Personality 
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that moral flexibility explains the relationship 
between a creative mindset and increased dishonesty. In Experiment 4, we examine whether 
justifications play a similar role in explaining the link between a creative personality and 
increased dishonesty. 
Method 
  Participants. One-hundred fifty-nine individuals from a city in the Southeastern United 
States (89 male; 111 students; Mage=25.38, SD=4.62) participated in the study. They were paid 
$4 for completing an online survey and could earn up to $6 during the lab component of the 
study (in addition to potential earnings related to other studies occurring in the same session). 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: high vs. low justification. 
Procedure. The study employed the same procedure as in Experiment 3 with two main 
differences. First, participants completed an online survey a week prior to the lab session. The 
survey included the same three measures assessing creativity employed in Experiment 1, and a 
measure assessing narcissism as a personality trait. We measured narcissism by using the 16-Creativity and Dishonesty  23 
 
item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-16) developed by Ames, Rose and Cameron (2006). 
This is a forced-choice measure, which includes items as “I really like to be the center of 
attention” and “I insist upon getting the respect that is due to me.” We included a measure for 
narcissism because prior research has demonstrated that people who think they are more creative 
than others also tend to be narcissists (Goncalo, Flynn, & Kim, 2010). Thus, it is important to 
show that the link between dispositional creativity and dishonest behavior we observed in 
Experiment 1 holds even when controlling for narcissism. The survey also included the RAT (the 
same 17 items as in Experiment 3). Second, differently from Experiment 3, this study only 
included the justification manipulation and not the priming one.  
Consistent with the results of Experiment 3, we expected that having room to justify 
potential lies would moderate the effects of dispositional creativity on dishonesty. In particular, 
we predicted that the relationship between creativity as an individual difference and dishonesty 
would be stronger in the low-justification condition than in the high-justification condition. 
Results and Discussion 
  Creative personality and creative performance. We first examined whether participants 
who scored high on dispositional creativity also performed better on the RAT. As shown in 
Table 3, this was in fact the case. Next, we conducted a regression analysis using a composite z-
score for the measures of creative personality as predictor of RAT performance while controlling 
for narcissism. Consistent with the correlations reported in Table 3, we found that a creative 
personality predicted creative performance on the RAT (B=1.95, [SE=.41], β=.37, t=4.70, 
p<.001). Narcissism did not (B=.03, [SE=.32], β=.007, t=.095, p=.93).  
  Die roll outcome. Next, we examined whether our justification manipulation moderated 
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(which are suggestive of lying). We tested this hypothesis using the moderated regression 
procedures recommended by Aiken and West (1991). In our regression analysis, we controlled 
for narcissism. As shown in Table 4, we found a significant interaction between the composite 
measure of a creativity personality and the justification manipulation in predicting participants’ 
self-reported outcome on the die roll (β=-.20, p<.05). To interpret the form of the interaction, we 
plotted the simple slopes for the relationship between dispositional creativity and self-reported 
outcome on the die roll at each level of our justification manipulation (see Figure 4). When 
participants rolled the die one time only (low-justification condition), dispositional creativity was 
associated with higher self-reported outcomes on the die roll (β=.56, p<.001). When participants 
rolled the die multiple times (high-justification condition), this association was still significant 
but was not as strong (β=.27, p=.01).  
These results suggest that a creative personality promotes dishonest behavior by 
increasing the ability of individuals to justify their (potential) unethical actions.     
Experiment 5: Doubling on Creativity 
  Our first four studies demonstrated a robust relationship between creativity and dishonest 
behavior, when creativity was both assessed as an individual difference and experimentally 
manipulated. In addition, through moderation, we found that moral flexibility explains this link. 
We designed a final study to test whether dispositional creativity moderates the effect of priming 
a creative mindset on dishonest behavior. We predicted that dispositional creativity would 
moderate the impact of primed creativity on dishonesty such that those who are more 
dispositionally creative are less influenced by the creativity prime as compared to those who are 
less dispositionally creative. 
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  Participants. One-hundred eight students from local universities in the Southeastern 
United States (53 male; Mage=21.94, SD=3.33) participated in the study for pay. They were paid 
a $2 show-up fee, $4 for completing an online survey, and could earn an additional $10 based on 
their performance in the study. 
Design and procedure. We used the same design and procedure as in Experiment 2, with 
only one difference. In addition to attending the session in the laboratory, participants completed 
an online survey with the three measures of creative personality we used in Experiments 1 and 4. 
Results and Discussion 
Means, standard deviations, and correlations for the three creativity variables appear in 
Table 5. We created individual z-scores for each of these measures and then averaged them into 
an aggregate measure for dispositional creativity.  
We tested whether a creative personality moderates the effect of priming a creative 
mindset on both creative performance and on dishonest behavior, following the moderated 
regression procedures recommended by Aiken and West (1991). Table 6 displays the results of 
our regression analyses. As we predicted, there was a significant interaction between our prime 
manipulation and dispositional creativity in predicting creative performance (B=-1.31 [SE=.61], 
Wald=4.65, p=.031), the amount of cheating (i.e., the percentage of participants who cheated, 
B=-1.12 [SE=.56], Wald=3.94, p=.047), and the extent of cheating (i.e., the degree to which 
participants cheated, B=-1.67 [SE=.84], t=-1.99, p=.049) (see Figure 5).  
When participants scored low on (the aggregated measure of) dispositional creativity, a 
creative mindset was associated with higher levels of creative performance (β=.55, p=.001), and 
greater cheating (β =.52, p=.001 for the decision to cheat and β=.48, p=.003 for the extent of 
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creative mindset was no longer associated with higher creative performance (β=.05, p=.73), nor 
with greater cheating (β=.03, p=.87 for the decision to cheat, and β=-.02, p=.89 for the extent of 
cheating, respectively). 
These results show that dispositional creativity moderates the relationship between 
priming a creative mindset and creative performance, as well as the relationship between priming 
a creative mindset and dishonest behavior. 
General Discussion 
  Over the last three decades, an increasing number of studies have highlighted the 
importance of creativity for individuals, organizations, and societies. The majority of this work 
has stressed the potential and real benefits of creative thinking. For instance, research has shown 
that creative products generate an average return that is significantly higher than that of 
“common” products (Horibe, 2001), and investments in creativity and innovation positively 
impact organizational performance (Lev, 2004). Creativity is also beneficial at the individual 
level, as it helps us manage our daily lives and find creative solutions to both ordinary and 
difficult problems.  
This paper casts a shadow on the widespread view that creativity always leads to “good.” 
In five studies, we demonstrated that creativity might also produce negative effects by leading 
individuals to more frequently engage in dishonest behavior. An initial pilot study conducted in 
the field demonstrated that employees who are in positions that require creativity are more likely 
to be morally flexible and engage in wrongdoing in the workplace. Experiment 1 found a 
significant relationship between creative personality and dishonesty, and demonstrated that 
creativity is a better predictor of dishonest behavior than intelligence. Experiment 2 showed that 
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control condition. Experiments 3 and 4 explored the mechanism explaining this link and 
demonstrated that participants who were primed to think creatively (Experiment 3) or who were 
highly creative (Experiment 4) were more likely to behave dishonestly because of their greater 
ability to justify their dishonest behavior. Finally, in Experiment 5, we both assessed creativity 
through an individual difference measure and manipulated it experimentally through priming. 
This final study demonstrated that a creative personality moderates the effects of activating a 
creative mindset on dishonest behavior. Priming a creative mindset is the most beneficial means 
of enhancing creative thinking for individuals who score low (rather than high) on dispositional 
creativity.  
Theoretical Contributions 
  The present research contributes to the creativity literature by offering new insights on 
the potential dark side of creative thinking. Prior work has identified several variables that 
significantly promote or inhibit creative performance and has argued for the importance of 
enhancing these factors with the primary goal of increasing creativity. Here, we highlight the 
potential unintended consequences of creativity. Greater creativity helps individuals solve 
difficult tasks across many domains, but creative sparks may lead individuals to take unethical 
routes when searching for solutions to problems and tasks.  
Our work also contributes to research on moral psychology and ethical decision making. 
Our findings are consistent with studies highlighting the importance of psychological factors in 
driving people’s dishonesty. An emerging literature has begun to identify when these often-
subtle factors influence decisions to behave unethically, both consciously and unconsciously 
(Chugh, Bazerman, & Banaji, 2005; Gino & Pierce, 2009; Mazar et al., 2008; Monin, Sawyer, & 
Marquez, 2008; Jordan & Monin, 2008; Shu, Gino, & Bazerman, 2011; Tenbrunsel & Messick, Creativity and Dishonesty  28 
 
2004). Here, we extend this body of work by showing that greater creativity can lead to greater 
dishonesty by increasing individuals’ ability to justify their immoral actions.  
Our research speaks to existing work on elastic justification (Hsee, 1995, 1996). This 
research finds that unjustifiable factors (those we wish to take into consideration but know we 
should not) influence individuals’ judgments more when there is ambiguity in the justifiable 
factors (those we believe we should take into consideration) than when there is not. Our studies 
demonstrate that this type of self-justification process occurs more easily when people have a 
creative personality or when they are in a creative mindset.  
The findings of the present research can be evaluated with respect to work on moral 
credentials. According to moral credentialing theory (Monin & Miller, 2001), when individuals 
become aware of their own moral deeds, they are more likely to act immorally on subsequent 
endeavors because they feel as if they earned “moral credits.” Similarly, being able to generate 
several original justifications for one’s own unethical actions thanks to creativity may lead 
people to feel licensed to cheat.  
Finally, the present work plants a first step in a research domain that is highly relevant to 
the increasingly changing, innovative, and competitive world of the 21st century. As innovation 
has increased, this century already has weathered a series of accounting scandals and the collapse 
of several billion-dollar companies, resulting in dramatic changes to the business landscape. 
Similarly, over the last decade, we have increasingly witnessed cases of academic dishonesty by 
both students and teachers, as well as scandals of scientific cheating. Dishonesty and innovation 
are two of the topics most widely written about in the popular press. Yet, to date, the relationship 
between creativity and dishonest behavior has not been studied empirically. We believe that 
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policy. We are often surprised to learn that successful and ingenious decision makers in these 
contexts have crossed ethical boundaries. The results from the current paper indicate that, in fact, 
people who are creative or work in environments that promote creative thinking may be the most 
at risk when they face ethical dilemmas. Our work offers the first empirical demonstration of the 
association between creativity and dishonesty, as well as evidence of the important role of 
justifications in explaining this relationship.  
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
These contributions must be qualified in light of several important limitations of our 
research, which could be addressed by future work. First, in our studies we created situations in 
which participants were tempted to cheat. We used tasks that likely triggered a conflict between 
participants’ short-term desire to earn undeserved money by cheating and their long-term desire 
to be ethical and thus not cheat. People commonly use self-control resources to resolve this type 
of conflict (Mead et al., 2009). Future research could investigate whether creativity would lead 
people to act in ways that satisfy their selfish, short-term desires rather than their higher goals 
when facing other types of self-control dilemmas, such as eating a slice of chocolate cake when 
trying to lose weight. As in the studies presented here, creativity may help individuals generate a 
variety of reasons to justify such self-serving behaviors. 
Future research could also further examine whether creativity influences individuals’ 
motivations to behave dishonestly as well as their ability to justify self-serving actions. Although 
our work focused on the effects of the latter, one could examine whether dispositional creativity 
and creative primes also increase individuals’ desire to cheat. For instance, creativity may lead 
people to think of more and diverse ways they could benefit from the monetary gains from 
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link between creativity and the desire to cheat, but do provide evidence that is inconsistent with 
this alternative explanation. Indeed, the results of Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrate that 
creativity increases individuals’ moral flexibility, thus increasing their ability to behave 
dishonestly. Thanks to greater creativity, people have more and diverse reasons to justify their 
own unethical behavior.   
Future work could also examine how creativity may lead to different consequences when 
people face ethical dilemmas if they are not tempted by the possibility of behaving dishonestly to 
earn more money. In our studies, we used tasks that would heighten participants’ desire to cheat. 
It is possible, however, that individuals may have different goals when facing ethical dilemmas. 
For instance, they may be motivated to behave consistently with their moral principles and 
standards. Depending on the salient goal driving individual behavior, creativity may results in 
actions that are prosocial rather than unethical, or actions that show moral courage. For instance, 
a negotiator may decide to disclose information that affects how much his counterpart thinks the 
issue being negotiated is worth, even if hiding the information would lead to a better deal for 
him. In this case, creativity would help the negotiators generate many different reasons why 
disclosing information is the proper action to take. Examining such possibility would further our 
understanding of the role of creativity in ethical decision making.  
Finally, future research could investigate the boundary conditions of the effects observed 
in our studies and examine how people and organizations can foster creativity and benefit from 
individuals’ creative sparks while avoiding unintended evil solutions. For instance, this research 
could manipulate the saliency of ethical standards (e.g., by using an ethics code), the strength of 
ethical norms, or the identity of moral exemplars, and examine whether these factors could be 
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could study the effects of creativity in groups and manipulate the level of competitiveness or 
cooperation within a group to examine whether promoting a climate of cooperation can reduce 
the effects of creativity on dishonest behavior. 
By calling attention to a previously underexplored relationship, that between creativity 
and dishonesty, our studies have uncovered findings of both theoretical and practical importance. 
Scholars need more knowledge regarding both the positive and negative consequences of 
thinking outside the box before fully embracing the recommendation to stimulate creativity in 
organizations and society more broadly. We hope this research will stimulate future endeavors 
that can further our understanding of how the process of self-serving justifications, triggered by 
creativity primes or a creative personality, can lead to dishonest behavior. 
Conclusions 
In the current studies, we found a robust relationship between creativity and dishonesty. 
This research provides a critical first step toward understanding how creativity is associated with 
unethical behavior, two often-discussed phenomena in our complex world. Across five studies, 
we demonstrated that both a creative personality and an activated creative mindset promote 
individuals’ ability to justify their unethical actions. In turn, this increased ability to justify 
potential unethical actions promotes dishonesty. Our results suggest that a link between 
creativity and rationalization. As Mazar et al. (2008) proposed, the ability of most people to 
behave dishonestly might be bounded by their ability to cheat and at the same time feel that they 
are behaving as moral individuals. To the extent that creativity allows people to more easily 
behave dishonestly and rationalize this behavior, creativity might be a more general driver of this 
type of dishonesty and play a useful role in understanding unethical behavior. Creativity and Dishonesty  32 
 
Appendix A 
Scenarios used in the Pilot Study 
 
1. Steve is the Operations manager of a firm that produces pesticides and fertilizers for lawns and 
gardens. A certain toxic chemical is going to be banned in a year, and for this reason is extremely 
cheap now. If Steve buys this chemical, produces and distributes his product fast enough, he will 
be able to make a very nice profit. If you were Steve, how likely is it you would use this chemical 
while it is still legal? 
2. Dale is the Operations manager of a firm that produces health food. Their organic fruit 
beverage has 109 calories per serving. Dale knows people are sensitive to crossing the critical 
threshold of one hundred calories. He could decrease the serving size by 10%. The label will say 
each serving has 98 calories, and the fine print will say each bottle contains 2.2 servings. If you 
were Dale, how likely is it you would cut the serving size to avoid crossing the 100 threshold? 
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Appendix B 
RAT items used in Experiments 3 and 4 
 
The goal in this task is to find a word that is logically linked to all three of the words provided. 
For example: (1) Manners Round Tennis  =  Table  (2) Playing Credit Report  =   Card 
 
Thus, the word "table" is a solution because it links the words "manners-round-table" (i.e. table 
manners, round table, table tennis).  The word "card" is a solution because it links the words 
"playing-credit-report" (i.e. playing card, credit card, report card).   
 
In the space below, try to solve as many items as you can.  Work as fast as you can without 
sacrificing accuracy. YOU HAVE FIVE MINUTES (i.e., 300 seconds) TO WORK ON THIS. 
Please do not use any help other than your own knowledge. 
 
 
Word 1  Word 2  Word 3  Solution 
Blank  White  Lines  Paper 
Magic  Plush  Floor  Carpet 
Thread  Pine  Pain  Needle 
Stop  Petty  Sneak  Thief 
Envy  Golf  Beans  Green 
Chocolate  Fortune   Tin  Cookie 
Barrel  Root  Belly  Beer 
Broken  Clear  Eye  Glass 
Pure  Blue  Fall  Water 
Widow  Bite  Monkey  Spider 
Chamber  Staff  Box  Music 
Mouse  Sharp  Blue  Cheese 
Hall  Car  Swimming  Pool 
Square  Cardboard  Open  Box 
Ticket  Shop  Broker  Pawn 
High  Book  Sour  Note 
Gold  Stool  Tender  Bar Creativity and Dishonesty  34 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics (on raw measures) and correlations (on z-scores of each measure), Pilot 
Study 
  M  SD    2  3  4 
1. Ratings provided by managers for the level 
of creativity required in each department 
7.10  1.94    .53***  .30**  .46*** 
2. Ratings provided by employees for the 
level of creativity required in their job 
4.84  1.55      .20*  .24* 
3. Ratings provided by employees for their 
likelihood to behave dishonestly across the 
eight behaviors 
2.58  1.05        .37*** 
4. Ratings provided by employees for their 
likelihood to behave dishonestly across the 
two dilemmas 
3.69  1.52         
 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics and correlations (using raw scores for each measure), Experiment 1 
    M  SD    1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
Creative 
personality 
1. Gough’s creative 
personality  
11.24  2.81                 
2. Creative cognitive 
style 
3.74  0.75    .54***             
3. Hocevar’s creative 
behavior inventory 
147.29  40.74    .45***  .54***           
Intelligence 
4. Cognitive 
Reflection Test score 
1.22  1.10    .003  -.04  -.04         
5. Mill vocabulary 
test score 
6.49  1.67    .001  -.08  .02  .30**       
Tasks 
6. Cheating level on 
problem solving task 
2.92  4.54    .53***  .35**  .42***  .04  .04     
7. Cheating level on 
multiple-choice task 
3.33  5.86    .31**  .25*  .25*  .02  -.11  .62**   
8. Cheating level on 
perceptual task
1 
71.95  23.38    .33**  .23*  .25*  .10  .08  .34**  .26* 
 
*** p<.001; ** p<.01; * p<.05 
 
Note. The dark rectangle depicts the relationship between the creativity measures and dishonesty. The dark square depicts the 
relationship between the intelligence measures and dishonesty. 
 
1 Cheating on the perceptual task is calculated as the number of times participants chose “more on the right” in ambiguous trials. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics and correlations (on raw measures), Experiment 4 
  M  SD    2  3  4  5 
1. Gough’s creative personality   2.18  1.62    .44***  .33***  .06  .19* 
2. Creative cognitive style  5.01  1.14      .43***  .23**  .45*** 
3. Hocebar’s Creative behavior 
inventory 
147.01  50.35        .36***  .22** 
4. Narcissism  4.30  3.74          .11 
5. Performance on the RAT  8.25  4.13           
 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Regression analysis predicting self-reported outcome on the die roll, Experiment 4 
  B  SE    β  t 
Narcissism   -.026  .107    -.018  -.243 
Justifications   .568  .205    .197  2.78** 
Creative personality  1.046  .186    .561  5.61*** 
Creative personality X 
Justifications 
-.539  .265    -.201  -2.04* 
R
2=.23 
                   F(4,154)=11.31*** 
       
 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for variables assessing creativity (on raw measures), 
Experiment 5 
  M  SD    2  3 
1. Gough’s creative personality   10.08  3.77    .46***  .35*** 
2. Creative cognitive style  3.56  0.76      .33** 
3. Hocebar’s Creative behavior 
inventory 
87.78  54.12       
 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
 
 
 
Table 6 
Moderated regression analyses, Experiment 5 
  Performance on the candle 
task 
  Decision to cheat on the 
problem-solving task 
  B  SE    Wald    B  SE    Wald 
Mindset (1=creative, 0=neutral)  1.44  .461    9.79**    1.18  .417    7.96** 
Creative personality  1.16  .497    5.43*    .93  .432    4.62* 
Creative personality X Mindset  -1.31  .606    4.65*    -1.12  .563    3.94* 
                                  Nagelkerke R
2 =.179        Nagelkerke R
2 =.149 
 
*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 
 
  Extent of cheating 
  B  SE    β  t 
Mindset (1=creative, 0=neutral)  1.53  .64    .23  2.41* 
Creative personality  1.24  .62    .28  2.00* 
Creative personality X Mindset  -1.67  .84    -.28  -1.99* 
R
2=.09 
              F(3,104)=3.43* 
       
 Creativity and Dishonesty  46 
 
Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Example of perceptual task, Experiment 1. 
Figure 2. Duncker Candle Problem, Experiment 2. 
Figure 3. Self-reported outcome of die roll by condition, Experiment 3. 
Figure 4. Simple slopes for self-reported outcome of die roll, Experiment 4. 
Figure 5. Simple slopes for the extent of cheating, Experiment 5.  
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Figure 1. 
(a) Unambiguous trial  (b) Ambiguous trial 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  
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Figure 5. 
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